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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
ing statutes. It found that the Minnesota courts apply the statute if a
cause of action may be said to have arisen in a foreign jurisdiction,
irrespective of the fact that it might also be found to have accrued in
the home jurisdiction,27 while Illinois holds that the suit is time-barred
if barred by the statute of limitations of any jurisdiction in which it
could have originally been brought.28 The court predicted that New
York would take the literal approach followed in Minnesota, i.e., that
"without the state" means just that and no more, and that causes of
action accruing both within and without the state would be subject to
the terms of the borrowing statute. Clearly, should the New York
Court of Appeals approve this reasoning, the import of the borrowing
statute will grow. The prolific number of interstate transactions today
could give rise to many instances of simultaneous accruals.
Both of the issues discussed above deserve attention from the
Court of Appeals or, more appropriately, from the Legislature. The
borrowing statute should be re-examined to determine whether its
policies are, in fact, being effectuated by the present state of the law.
CPLR 203(e): Personal representative denied leave to amend a per-
sonal injury complaint to add a timely wrongful death action.
When a plaintiff in a personal injury action dies from his injuries
before verdict, report or decision, Estates, Powers and Trusts Law
section 11-3.3(b)(2) 29 provides that his personal representative may
"enlarge" the personal injury complaint to include a cause of action
for wrongful death. When the personal representative attempts to do
this after the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death30 has
elapsed, the question arises whether the death action may be deemed
to have been commenced when the original process in the personal in-
jury action was served. Prior to the enactment of the CPLR, this
question was governed by Harriss v. Tams31 which held that a new
liability or obligation set up in an amended pleading did not relate
back, for statute of limitation purposes, to the time when the original
pleading was served. Because a wrongful death action involves lia-
bilities separate and distinct from those in a personal injury action,32
relation back was not allowed when a death action was initiated by
27 478 F.2d at 868, citing Pattridge v. Palmer, 201 Minn. 887, 277 N.W. 18 (1937).
28 478 F.2d at 368, citing Strong v. Lewis, 204 111. 35, 68 N.E. 556 (1903).
29 N.Y. EsT., Powams & TRuTs LAW § 11-8.3(b)(2) (McKinney 1967).
30 The two-year period runs from the date of death. N.Y. Esr., Pois & TRUSTS LAW
§ 54.1 (McKinney 1967).
81258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932).
32 See Greco v. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 31-32, 12 N.E.2d 557, 560 (1938); Paskes v.
Buonaguro, 42 Misc. 2d 1004, 1005, 249 N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964).
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amendment to personal injury pleadings. CPLR 203(e) was intended
to liberalize the rule of Harriss v. Tams by allowing relation back
whenever the original pleading gives "notice of the transaction, occur-
rence, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to
the amended pleading."3 Although courts have interpreted this statute
as allowing relation back of new causes of action set up in amended
pleadings,3 4 they have disagreed as to whether this treatment is appro-
priate for a wrongful death action. 85 One justification for denying rela-
tion back as to a wrongful death action has been that the personal in-
jury pleading does not give notice of the causal relationship between
the injury and the death. 86 Courts allowing the relation back have
found the notice in the original pleading adequate.37
The relation back controversy took a new turn in Tromblee v.
Capraro38 wherein the Supreme Court, Nassau County, denied a sur-
viving plaintiff's motion to amend a personal injury complaint to in-
clude a cause of action for the wrongful death of a co-plaintiff although
the motion was made well within the two-year limitation period. The
court quoted Dean Joseph M. McLaughlin, who has stated that
... it is conceptually discomfitting to permit the cause of action for
wrongful death to relate back to the original service of process,
because at the time that process was served, there did not then exist
a cause of action for wrongful death .... 3)
33 CPLR 203(e). See Berlin v. Goldberg, 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 1076, 266 N.Y.S.2d 475,
478-79 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 279, 283 (1966); 1 WK&M 1 203.29; SECOND REP. 50, 51.
34 See Andrews v. Donabella, 60 Misc. 2d 1007, 304 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 758, 771 (1970);
Town Bd. of the Town of Fallsburgh v. National Security Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 23. 277
N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1967), aff'd mem., 29 App. Div. 2d 726, 286 N.YS.2d
122 (3d Dep't 1968).
35 Wilkening v. Fogarty, 40 App. Div. 2d 1031, 338 N.Y.S.2d 985 (2d Dep't 1972)
(concurring opinion) (relation back should not be allowed); Palmer v. N.Y.C. Trans. Auth..
37 App. Div. 2d 766, 324 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1971) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Ruv. 561, 563 (relation back allowed); Roberson v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 63 Misc. 2d 105, 311 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afl'd mem., 34 App. Div.
2d 896, 311 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Ist Dep't 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 500, 503 (1971) (relation back disallowed); Berlin v. Goldberg, 48 Misc. 2d 1073,
266 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966), discussed in The Quarterly Survey,
41 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 279, 283 (1966) (relation back allowed); Ringle v. Bass, 46 Misc. 2d
896, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1965), discussed in The Biannual Survey,
40 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 803, 307 (1966) (relation back allowed).
36See Roberson v. First Nat'l City Bank, 63 Misc. 2d 105, 106, 311 N.Y.S.2d 601, 603
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 34 App. Div. 2d 896, 311 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Ist Dep't 1970).
37 See, e.g., Berlin v. Goldberg, 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 266 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1966), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JOHN's L. Rlv. 279, 283 (1966).
38 73 Misc. 2d 87, 341 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
3973 Misc. 2d at 88, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 624, quoting 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 203, commen-
tary at 122 (1972).
[Vol. 48:159
SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
In denying the plaintiff's motion, the court relied on cases where per-
sonal representatives had sought to assert time-barred wrongful death
claims by motions to amend personal injury pleadings. 40 While recog-
nizing that the plaintiff could achieve an identical result by bringing
a separate wrongful death action and then seeking a consolidation,41
the court declared that it could not "on the grounds of expediency,
permit an amendment which... is conceptually unsound." 42
The doctrine of relation back is invoked to save a cause of action
which would be time-barred if asserted in a separate action. It would
appear that when the wrongful death action is timely, there need be no
relation back and no resulting conceptual discomfiture. The cause of
action may be deemed to have been commenced at the time of the
motion to amend. The Tromblee holding defies Estates, Powers and
Trust Law section 11-3.3(b)(2) and numerous cases which have per-
mitted the amendment upon a showing of a causal relationship between
the original personal injury and the death.43 Additionally, the Trom-
blee decision appears to conflict with CPLR 3025(b). That statute
provides that "[a] party may amend a pleading or supplement it by
setting forth additional or subsequent transactions or occurrences at
any time by leave of the court .... ." The statute further requires that
"[]eave shall be freely granted." The addition of a cause of action for
wrongful death certainly appears to be a supplementation to set forth
a subsequent transaction. In light of these statutory requirements, a
plaintiff asserting a timely wrongful death claim should not be put to
the circuitous procedure of commencing a separate action and then
seeking a consolidation.
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 308(5): Judicially devised service held permissible in matri-
monial actions.
DRL 2324 seemingly forbids entry of a default judgment in a
40 73 Misc. 2d at 88, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 625, citing Wilkening v. Fogarty, 40 App. Div. 2d
1031, 338 N.Y.S.2d 985 (2d Dep't 1972) (concurring opinion); Roberson v. First Natl City
Bank, 63 Misc. 2d 105, 311 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 84 App. Div.
2d 896, 311 N.YS.2d 265 (1st Dep't 1970).
41Actions involving common questions of law or fact may be consolidated pursuant
to CPLR 602.
42 73 Misc. 2d at 89, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
43 See, e.g., Fuller v. Preis, 34 App. Div. 2d 514, 308 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1st Dep't 1970);
Nugent v. Downing, 3 App. Div. 2d 1030, 309 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.);
Coleman v. Gelb, 12 App. Div. 2d 915, 211 N.YS.2d 229 (Ist Dep't 1961) (mem.).
44 DRL 232 provides that when the complaint is not served with the summons in a
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